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 This short presentation  brings together some of  economics and  linguistics   on the 
topic of  language origins. This topic has directed attention to  properties of human 
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language, particularly  how  linguistic signs or symbols have inherited design features 
which are present in linguistic communication . In this presentation  I  will show how 
some  features of language can be adequately understood as a result of  coordination 
games. I will argue that modern language  originated as a consequence of  trade 
relationships and the division of labor    involved by early humans  around 40.000  years 
ago. As an economic activity, both trade ( or exchange) relationships and division of 
labor  call  for coordination. The resulting outcome of  this approach entails  that games 
and economic behavior have a significant causal relationship to some general properties 
of the linguistic symbol.  
                                             1. Adam Smith=s dog 
 Language and economics  have been related since at least Adam Smith=s reflections 
on the origin of the division of labor. Smith attributes the division of labor to language or 
the faculty of reason1. In his Wealth of Nations of 1776.  Smith writes : 
    The division of labour , from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally   
   the effect of any human wisdom,..., it is the necessary   consequence of a certain       
propensity in human nature : the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing  
   for another ... This propensity ... seems to be the necessary consequence of the       
faculties of reason and speech. 
  Smith goes on to assert that this propensity is unique to man, thus  writing these well 
known words: 
    No body ever  saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for            
 another with another dog.  
 
1 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations., 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981. General editors: R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner. 
 According to Smith=s speculation,  division of labor, goods exchange and  language 
could all be causally related . The division of labor  produces a diversity of goods that 
could be exchanged. Goods exchange  creates  the necessity of a contract, and 
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contracts  require  concerted or coordinated actions among the contracting individuals. 
In coordinating actions , agents are  involved in communication games whereby  they  
convey the information required for the exchange. A symbolic and complex language 
then subserves the  communication of  information 
  Modern linguistics as well has also adopted a view  that leads  to economics and even 
political theory and philosophy. I will start off by mentioning Ferdinand de Saussure.  In 
his Course de Linguistique Générale of 1916, Saussure asserted  that the linguistic 
signs, or Ala langue A , had originated in a social contract: A There is a language  C 
Sassure says  2 --  only in virtue of a kind of  social contract handed on among members 
of a community  A  Morover, the Swiss  linguist was the first to establish that  language 
was comprised of related signs that form  a system. The saussurean sign is a one-to-
one mapping from meaning  to sound that is lodged in the brains of at least  two 
speakers. All individuals  bound  by language,  Saussure 3  says ,reproduce the same  
sounds 4  mapped onto the same concepts. The origin of this social crystalization, 
Saussure goes on to explain , lies in the fact that the meaning-sound mapping is  the 
same for all the individuals sharing a language because there is a coordination faculty 
that makes such coordination possible.       
 
2  F. de Saussure, Cours, Introd. III, ' 2 : A [ La langue ] n=existe qu=en vertu d=un 
sorte de contrat passé entre les membres de la communauté A .  
3 F. de Saussure, Cours, Introd. III, ' 2. 
4Strictly speaking, it is a mental representation of the articulated sounds  what is 
mapped into a concept  or meaning. Both sound and meaning have a mental  reality. 
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   Some years later, in 1933,  the american linguist Leonard Bloomfield in his Language, 
a work  resting on Saussure=s  shoulders,   emphasized more than Saussure  that 
language is a coordination problem between sound and meaning, and that this 
coordination  A makes it possible for man to interact with great precision 5 A.  He 
bolstered  Smith=s speculation on the relatedness of language to the division of labor, 
when he asserted that language always accompanies every human action.  
Bloomfield 6   argues that: 
A In the ideal case, within a group of people who speak to each other, each person has 
as its disposal the strength and skill of every person in the group.. The more these 
persons differ as to special skills, the wider a range of power does each one person 
control. The division of labor, and with it, the whole working of human society, is due to 
language A. 
 
5 Leonard Bloomfield, Language, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1933, ' 2.2 
6 Bloomfield, Language, ' 2.3 
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  These words suggest that  Bloomfield=s approach to the function  of language calls to 
mind Smith=s speculation on language and division of labor. As economist Karl 
Wärneryd  remarked,   there is no logical reason to expect that language is what makes 
possible the exchange 7 . For one thing  division of labor -- although not as in humans -- 
 occurs in animals without a complex language as in ants , wasps,  bees and wolf packs 
8.  Specialization in social insects is so surprinsing that Dawkins 9 asserts that these 
insects discovered - before man ! - that cultivation of food is more efficient than hunting-
gathering10 .   Therefore it is difficult to attribute   the faculty of language as  the main 
motivation that led to the division of labor 11. 
 
7 Karl Wärneryd , A Language, Evolution and the Theory of Games A , in J.L.Casti and 
A. Karlqvist, Cooperation and Conflict in General Evolutionary Porcesses, New York:John 
Wiley, 1995 , 405-421, tackles the relationship between exchange and language in a different 
but insightful way  .  
8  Smith=s oblivion of social insects was already  noticed by Hendrik Houthakker , 
 A Economics and Biology : Specialization and Speciation A, Kyklos, 9-2 ,pp.181-1897, 
(1956). Rececently, zoologist L. David Mech has added more evidence on the division of 
labor in wolf packs : A The typical wolf pack, then, should be viewed as a family with adult 
parents guiding the activities of the group and sharing group leadership in a division-of-labor 
system in which the female predominates primarily in such activities as pup care and defense 
and the male primarily during foraging and food provisioning and travels associated with 
them A. L. David Mech  A Alpha status, dominance and division of labor in wolf packs A, 
Canadian Journal of Zoology , 77:1196-1203, (1999). 
9 R.Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press,1989, p.180. 
10 Slavery, warfare, and  robbery can be found among social insects as well as in 
humans.See W.D. Hamilton, A Selection of Selfish and Altruistic Behavior in Some Extreme 
Models A, in W.D. Hamilton, Narrow Roads of Gene Land, Oxford:W.H.Freeman, 1995, 
p.216. 
11 L.von Mises as well asserted  that the division of labor makes man distinct from 
animals: A It is the division of labor that has made feeble man, far inferior to most animals in 
physical strength, the lord of earth and the creator of the marvels of technology A.L.von 
Mises, Liberalism: The Classical Tradition, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,2005, p.18. 
Notwithstanding the core role of the division of labour, neoclassical and modern economists 
have observed that Smith=s theory would lead to an organization of the market dominated by  
increasing returns, which is not borne out; see James M. Buchanan , A Generalized Increasing 
Returns, Euler=s Theorem, and Competitive Equilibrium A, History of Political Economy, 
31:3, 1999, pp.511-523 . 
 
 6 
                                                
 As the division of labor may occur without language, it would behoove us to look back  
to trade, or to the deliberate exchange of goods as a reasonable hypothesis to explain 
how language originated and acquired its properties.   
   In a recent paper, economists Richard Horan, Erwin Bulte and Jason Shogren 12  
developed a mathematical model to explain why Neandertal man went extinct  while 
coexisting  with Homo sapiens. This paper=s  title is fairly suggestive to my own present 
 purpose: A How Trade13 Saved Humanity from Biological Exclusion...@. They explore 
two hypotheses : biological exclusion and behavioral exclusion. 
    Biological exclusion predicts that the  neandertal extinction would have been slower 
than it actually was. Also, if neandertals were biologically more efficient, Shogren=s 
model predicts, contrary to fact, that  humans would not have coexisted with 
neandertals. 
 
12 Richard D. Horan, Erwin Bulte, Jason F. Shogren, A How Trade Saved Humanity 
from Biological Exclusion: an Economic Theory of Neandertall Extinction A, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 58: 1- 29, 2005.  
13 Trade means in Shogren=s model  A exchange A , be it voluntary or involuntary 
(centralized o dictatorial ) . 
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 The reason why humans survived, although they were biologically inferior to 
neandertals, is  better explained by  the behavioral exclusion theory. Behavioral 
exclusion theory proposes that  humans survived due to the  division of labor and 
specialization, which neandertals lacked. The most plausible scenario envisaged by 
Shogren=s model is one in which there is  complete division of labor within  two groups 
of humans: skilled hunters that harvested  meat and unskilled hunters who produced 
other goods. In passing, notice that these two groups of humans were already 
envisioned by Smith in his  Wealth of Nations I.ii.3 14   
 Even with a modicum of trade in neandertals, humans overcame neandertals. Their  
model proves that humans survived  neandertals because of the availability of meat 
consumption was  greater among  humans due to the division of labor. These 
economists conclude their paper noticing that 
 AA crucial issue remains unresolved: it is an open question why the early humans first 
realized the competitive edge from trade. Some attribute the edge to differences in 
cognition or language abilities or both, but the jury is still out . A 
 
14 A In a tribe of hunters or sepherds a particular person makes bows and arrows, for 
example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for 
cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get 
more cattle and venison, than if he himself went to the field to catch them A ( A. Smith, WN, 
Liberty Fund edition ) 
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The issue may be elucidated by looking into neandertal language. As  there is no  
evidence that neandertals had a complex language as there is of early humans 15, the 
hypothesis  that the competitive edge could be realized by developing abstract symbols 
becomes compelling.  The conclusion then that  language and trade were originally in 
tandem seems unescapable . At this point it would seem logical  to me that all cognitive 
capacities involved in trade ( such as the designing of  tools for manufacturing 
exchangable goods, the exchange value of  goods , and the ability to make decisions on 
goods ) should be observable in language. 
 Now, the next step involves determining  which came  first, language or trade ?  
Although no sharp response can be given, there is some logical priority to  trade as 
opposed  to language. Three arguments may be adduced.  First, language is neither  a  
necessary condition  for the division of labor nor for trade .In the Shogren - Smith=s  
model, it is meat consumption and a previous division among members of the tribe ( 
skilled versus unskilled individuals)  which  triggered the division of labor.  According to 
Shogren, the assumption that early humans were more skilled hunters than neandertals, 
allowed  them  to  produce meat enough to exchange for goods produced by unskilled 
hunters.  
 Second, as language basically  involves  coordination  problems, the same that   trade 
and the division of labor do, it is plausible to assume that language depends on trade 
and the division of labor as well as on   the more complex social relations  added by 
trade. The ground for this dependency lies in the fact that the division of labor leads to 
coordination between ( at least ) two individuals thus  incurring external coordination 
costs 16 . As a result,  language could be a consequence of  external coordination costs, 
 
15 There has been a hot debate on the issue of neandertal language.The issue has been 
settled by  P. Lieberman, The Biology and Evolution of Language, Cambr., Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1984 and S. Mithen, The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, 
Language, Mind and Body, Camb., Mass.:Harvard University Press, 2006, p.221, who argue 
that neandertals at most  had an inferior linguistic capacity than Homo sapiens. It should be 
emphasized that no real evidence for a neandertal language has been offered. 
16  H. Houthakker, A Economics and Biology: Specialization and Speciation A, Kyklos 
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contributing to set off against such costs. 
 A third argument is that some  games can be played ( or preplayed) using 
communication, and in particular cheap talk , which does not add more or less value to 
payoffs. 
  So trade may occur without language, but language must be motivated., in the sense 
that a speaker S sends a message μ  to a receiver R  with a particular intentionality.  
 
9-2 ,1956 ,181-189. 
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 The scenario set up by trading can  boost a  symbolic communication system as rich as 
modern human language. Karl Wärneryd17  addresses the role of language in  economic 
activities reminding that neoclassical economists start from the premise that exchange  
follows from the well-defined preferences of individuals with a basket of  consumption 
goods . When preferences ( or payoffs) are in equilibrium, however, it may occur that 
some equilibria are more efficient and stable than others. Communication selects the 
more efficient equilibrium if it  is costless. Exchange , then, triggers or motivates 
language, not the other way around. Consequently, if animals do not have full symbolic 
communication it=s  because they do not exchange goods , which  motivates the 
existence of a language 18. Smith=s dog has not evolved language because it requires 
exchange and coordination . As he has nothing to coordinate, he doesn=t need a  
language . The dog is tied to its costly signals.  
   I=ll  wind up, then, that trade is a robust candidate  for the origins of a  modern 
symbolic language. 
 
                                                        2 
                                           Games and Symbols 
   
 
17 Karl Wärneryd , A Language, Evolution and the Theory of Games A , in J.L.Casti 
and A. Karlqvist, Cooperation and Conflict in General Evolutionary Porcesses, New 
York:John Wiley, 1995 . 
18 W.D. Hamilton , A Innate Social Aptitudes of Man...@, in :W.D. Hamilton, Narrow 
Roads of Gene Land, Oxford: W.H.Freeman, 1995, p.342,  makes  out a case for the idea that 
tools and language confer benefits to a cooperative hunter . 
 Now, I will take up a subset of Hockett=s design features and  will endavour to show 
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how they fit into the coordination game  framework . We should bear in mind the main 
difference between traditional game theory and coordination game theory : the former  
deals with winning strategies, and a solution concept or equilibrium , and  the latter 
deals with players=  common  interests strategies  and possibly multiple 
equilibria.Consequently, players in common interest games make use of cognitive 
strategies like imitation, analogy,  reasoning , guessing, imagination, common 
knowledge, among others.  
 Design features are understood as properties that  characterize language as a  
communication system which can be used to compare language to signals of other 
nonhuman communication systems. For the moment I will ignore animal signals and  I 
will mainly focus on linguistics symbols as originated in the coordination game of trade 
and division of labor. 
I will deal with the following Hockett=s design features19  : ( 1 ) Duality , ( 2 ) Semanticity, 
  ( 3 ) Parity, ( 4 ) Specialization, ( 5 ) Prevarication, and ( 6 ) Cultural transmission. 
  Let=s look at  these features to see precisely  how  they might be construed as games.  
 
  ( 1 ) Duality . Def.( Saussure, Course de Ling. Gen. I.1. '1 ) A The linguistic sign [i. e. 
symbol] is a mental entity with two faces : a concept [ meaning ]  and an acoustic image 
[ sound ] . These two elements are tightly joined and one demands the other[ 
bidirectional mapping ] @ .Idem I.1. '2 :  A The tie [ the mapping ] joining meaning and 
sound is arbitrary A . 
 
19 Some of these features were previously studied by Saussure and Bloomfield, but 
are known as Hockett=s design features; C.F. Hockett,  A Logical Considereations in the Study 
of Animal Communication@, in: W. F. Lanyon and  W.N. Tavolga,eds, Animal Sounds and 
Communication, Washington, Am. Inst. Of  Bio. Stud., Sympos. Ser. 7, 1960, 392-430.  
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   The first conundrum  that  the saussurean sign  poses is  a coordination problem. In 
order to communicate, agents-speakers of a community must make the same 
associations between sound and meaning. Such coordination  is  solved by means of  a 
 coordination game 20  between meaning and sound . It must be noticed that Saussure 
( Cours, Intro. III. ' 2 ) put forth that speakers in a population P must be endowed with  A 
 receptive and  coordinating faculties A  to attain the same  one-to-one mapping. 
Therefore meaning and sound must be coordinated in a communicating  population P of 
senders / receivers because both meaning and sound are unattached to each other. 
Meaning of  sign S1 could a priori be attached to any other string of sounds σn  and vice 
versa. This coordination problem   can thus  be formulated in the following  way : how do 
 sender and  receiver of a  message assign the same bidirectional mapping from 
meaning into sound and from sound into meaning ? 
  As all members of the population P  want to use the same signs to communicate , all 
have a common interest and therefore must coordinate  their choice. This is in essence  
a coordination game, in  Schelling=s sense 21 . More specifically, he characterizes a 
coordination game according to the following three traits: 
   (1 ) Players= preferences are identical, so  there is no conflict of interest 
 ( 2 ) Each player=s best choice depends on the action he expects the other to take, 
which in turn depends on the other=s expectations of his own. In other words, the game 
is based upon the  players=  mutual expectations.  
 ( 3 ) The players=  goal is to share some common- interest activity by means of some 
cognitive process ( Schelling=s imagination, poetry and humor ). In the case of language, 
 
20 Wittgenstein=s language games may be construed as coordination games. See L. 
Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen , '' 2, 8, 21, 48-51.   
21 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambrige, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1980, 83-118.  
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players want to use the same signs to communicate with each other.  
Look at table 1. One player  chooses a Row and other player chooses a  Column. Row 
and Column represent tacit processes determining the payoffs. Since the players=  goal 
is not to win, as in zero sum games,  but rather  to share some common interest by 
searching tacitly through cognitive processes, payoffs then only represent the degree of 
coordination attained by the players22 . So the payoff  matrix for a coordination game is 
different from zero sum games and non zero sum games. If players combine < R1 , C1 
> they are better off than combining < R1, C2 > and better off than combining < R2 , C1 
> and so on. As it is possible that whenever choosing one Row and chosing one Column 
players A win A , that is, they guess what each other is thinking, this winning  results < 1, 
1 >  can be arranged in a diagonal line :                                           
Please, number rows on the left side of the table top-down as R1, R2, R3, R4,R5. 
                  C1      C2     C3     C4     C5                     
 
    1  
1  
 
    0 
0 
 
    0 
0 
 
   0 
 0  
   
 
    0 
0 
 
    0 
0 
 
    1 
1 
 
    0 
0 
 
   0 
0 
 
    0 
0 
 
    0 
  0 
 
   0 
0 
 
    1 
1 
 
   0 
0 
 
    0 
0 
 
    0 
0 
 
   0 
0 
 
    0 
0 
 
   1 
1 
 
    0 
0 
 
   0 
0 
 
   0 
0 
 
    0 
0 
 
   0 
0 
 
    1 
1 
                                                 
22 Such processes may  equal to the usual strategies in conflict games, but 
contrary to conflict games,  no minimax solution exists for them.      
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                              Table  1 
 ( Lower left entry in cells is payoff to row-player, upper right is payoff to  column-player) 
 
  Let=s get  back now  to design features of language. Duality is conceived in Saussure=s 
sense as a  bidirectional  mapping from sound and meaning such that both sound and 
meaning being autonomous of each other, but  must be coordinated by senders / 
receivers in order  to attain optimal communication .  What cognitive strategies are 
involved in duality ?  Some tacit strategies come to mind : ( 1 ) Random mapping; ( 2 )  
Imitation ; ( 3 )Probabilistic mapping , and  ( 4  )  knowledge of   convention in Lewis 
sense 23 . 
                                                 
23  D.Lewis, Convention, Harvard University Press, 1969. 
   Linguistic conventions are not explicit but tacit  agreements. This means that speakers 
must use cognitive strategies to coordinate sound and meaning. Convention can be 
arrived  at by calling on a variety of such strategies. Saussure assumed the existence of 
a coordinative capacity in man. This assumption , however, sets up a circular argument. 
A much more adequate explanation  is that of  Lewis= convention.  
  
( 2  ) Semanticity : Def.  A The elements of a communicative system [ linguistic symbols] 
have associative ties with things and situations, or types of things and situations, in the 
environment of its users... such ties   are  semantic conventions shared by speakers A 
  The bidirectional mapping sound-meaning should be distinguished from the mapping 
symbol - denotation (  things, situations,  or simply , actions  ). Adopting a lewisian 
theory of meaning, symbols ( or signals in the game theory sense ) are mapped into 
actions  so  that actions can be true or false if they establish a coordinating equilibrium. 
Table 2 shows such equilibrium. Signal A means ( is mapped onto) action X , with payoff 
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(1,1 ) , while signal B means action Y with payoff (1, 1 ) .Mapping is established by 
convention in Lewis= sense:  
             
                                       Receiver 
                                         Action 
                                    X        Y        
 Sender signal    A      1,1    0,0      
    type                B       0,0   1,1  
 
                            Table 2                         
( 3 ) Interchangeability , or parity : Def. A Adult members of any speech community are 
interchangeably transmitters and receivers of linguistic signals A.  
   This feature derives from the definition of a coordination game without proof, as this 
game is played by dyads of speakers. Yet parity has been challenged by rationalist 
philosophers and linguists.  Rationalist philosophers  claim  that language is used  only 
for the expression of thought , not for social communication. However, the game theory 
approach to language demands  that   language strictly  be  used and motivated for the 
communication of intentions. Besides, this should be taken not only as its current 
function, but as the original function 24.Since the communicative function overrides the 
representational function in efficiency or coordination, the claim that language is for the 
expression of thought is not  motivated by game theory,  Communication,  not 
expression of thinking,  subserves coordination.      
 
 
24 Assuming that communication is both the original and the current function of 
language avoids the issue ( for which Darwinism lacks an adequate response) of how an 
original organ transforms its original function into another function, contrary to N. Chomsky 
that asserts that we don=t know the original purpose of language, although he assumes a 
transformation of the original function into the A expression of thought A function; see  Marc 
W.Kirschner and John C. Gerhart, The Possibility of Life, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2005; M.Hauser, N. Chomsky and T.Finch, AThe Faculty of Language: What is it, Who has it, 
and How did it Evolve ? A  Science ,298, 1569-1579 , 2002. 
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 ( 4 ) Specialization : Def.: A A communicative act, or a whole communicative system, is 
specialized to the extent that its direct energetic consequences are biologically irrelevant 
. Obviously language is a specialized communicative system. A 
   Contrary to language, animal signals have direct biological consequences as well as 
energetic costs . In insects, signals ( calls and songs ) emitted by a male insect serve to 
attract  females  as sexual mates 25 .  The bees=  dance informs  only  about the food 
source 26.  Also birds= alarm signals alert other conspecifics to flee. The bird  that warns 
its conspecifics by emiting an alarm call  is in grave danger of  dying because it attracts 
the predator=s attention. This example shows that communicative behaviour in animals 
adopts  strategies that incur  costs - benefits27 , as in conflict of interest games.   
Dawkins points out  that  A the belief that animal communication signals originally evolve 
to foster mutual benefits, is too simple A . Rather, he continues, A  all animal interactions 
involve at least  some conflict of interest A. As linguistic communication is basically  a  
coordination game, it  is  costless, or cheap;  costs and benefits of sending and 
receiving signals are irrelevant .  Language, then, may  be conceived as a signalling 
game, where both sender and receiver obtain equal  payoffs because they share the 
same interests28 . Moreover, animals signals may be dishonest, while language lacks 
dishonest signals.  Language evolved for coordination, thereby  it sets  a big hurdle for a 
strict darwinian view on language origins 29. 
 
25 H. Carl Gerhardt and Franz Huber, Acoustic Communication in Insects and 
Anurans, The University of Chicago Press, 2002, observed that some insects lose weight 
during call transmission. 
26  For these and other examples of animal calls , see R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, 1989. 
27  R.Dawkins, The selfish Gene, Oxford University Press,1989, 68 -87. 
28 Otherwise said, the utility function of Sender u ( s )  and Receiver u ( a  ) are equal.  
29 As linguistic communication is a pure coordination, mass phenomenon (  
individuals genetically unrelated),  it  is a real conundrum for a natural selection account of 
language origins and evolution,  that ranges over either individuals or genes . This  is skipped 
 by  S. Pinker, The Language Instinct, New York: HarperPerennial,1995 . 
 
 17 
                                                
 ( 5  )  Prevarication.  Def.  A Linguistic messages can be false, and they can be 
meaningless in the logicien=s sense.  A 
 A main difference between animal signals and linguistic symbols lies in that animal=s 
communication by means of signals is  truthful , while communication by linguistic 
symbols may or may not be truthful . Signals  correspond to a set of fixed states either of 
the animal type   ( hunger, sex ) or the environmental type ( danger ). Therefore, 
prevarication or lying is not  a real option for animals 30 . However, the possibility of  the 
receiver being manipulated by the sender has been emphasized as an option in animal 
communication 31 . Linguistic communication takes on truthful  messages  sent by 
truthful senders.   This is called the Atruth bias A by game theorists .The speaker is, in 
turn commited to the truth of her messages.  
 The nature of lying is due to the symbolic makeup of human communication that 
comprises  conventionality and unboundedness  .  Biologically, lying is a cost for a 
symbolic system because it contributes  selfish , parasitical, but  uncoordinating 
behavior 32 .  
 Game theory 33  seems to open a window both  into the existence of lying and The 
Decay of Lying, as Oscar Wilde  put it in this comedy 34  . Lying is a kind of behavior that 
fits into  a  two person partial interest game, that is, a game in which some agent is not 
 
30 W. D. Hamilton, A Selection of selfish and altruistic behavior in some extreme 
models A, remarks that  A by our lofty standards, animals are poor liers@ ; in W.D. Hamilton , 
Narrow Roads of Gene Land, Oxford:W.H.Freeman, 1995, p.218.In turn, Karl Popper 
artfully suggested that Ahuman language evolved because it made lying possible A, in P.A. 
Schilpp, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, vol 2, La Salle :Open Court, (1974) , pp.1112-1113. 
31 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press,1989, p.64.  
32 W.D. Hamilton, A Innate Social   Aptitudes of Man : an Approach from 
Evolutionary Genetics A, in  W. D. Hamilton, Narrow Roads of Gene Land, Oxford: W.H. 
Freeman, 1995, p.332. 
33 On lying as a game, s. L. Wittgenstein, Phil.Untersuch. ' 249. 
34  Wilde=s words wittily express the nonpredominance of lying : A With the possible 
exceptions of barristers, lying as an art has decayed. A 
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strictly coordinating . Table 3  represents   such a game. Thus sender sends a signal 
which triggers a best action by receiver  
                   Receiver 
                                         Action 
                                    X        Y        Z 
 Sender signal    A      4,4    1,1       6, 3 
    type                B      1,1    4, 4      6, 3 
                                           Table 3 
                              Partial interest game ( lying ) 
This matrix takes on values of common interests as well as of conflict of interests. The 
combination < A, Z > = ( 6 , 3 ) and combination < B, Z > 
represent the case  in which the sender has obtained a 
profit over the receiver35 . 
  Note, however, that lying is a  violation of  linguistic conventions, but these conventions 
can=t be associated with lying because if they were there  would be a winning strategy 
for agents ( receivers of messages)  such as  A If the sender lies Busing a lying strategy 
B do not act as the sender expects A . Thus a better and winnng strategy  would evolve. 
Therefore, one can deduce that lying cannot be evolutionary stable 36.This  evolutionary 
game  explains  why there are no markers ( no conventions)  for lying in human 
languages.  
( 6 ) Cultural transmission: Def. A The continuity of language from generation to 
generation is provided by tradition. All traditional behaviour is learned [ from others ]. 
Tradition becomes transformed into cultural transmission when the passing down of 
traditional habits is mediated by symbols. A 
 It is beyond doubt that symbols of a language are learned across generations. Besides, 
 
35 Experimental work shows both that lying pays as well as the truth bias of agents; 
Toshiji Kawagoe and Hirokazu Takizawa, A Why Lying Pays : Truth Bias in the 
Communication with Conficting Interests A. Tokyo, 2005. Accessible on Internet. 
36 See R. Dawkins  
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symbols make up grammatical patterns . Linguists and psychologists discuss whether or 
not there exists an innate device, not culturally but genetically transmitted,  that makes 
grammar learning possible. Supporters of an innate device assume the existence of an 
absolute invariant37  Universal Grammar (UG) genetically transmitted  that would explain 
language learning with no resort to cultural transmission.UG is conceived  as a random 
generator device or automaton.  
   The UG hypothesis , however, has proved unable to present observable or empirical 
universals that account for overt and regular  crosslinguistic variation 38.  
 
37 That is false in a strict (neo)darwinian view. 
38 Universals of the kind required by supporters of the random generator view of 
universal grammar are located at the biological ( brain )  level of inquiry, skipping most of 
overt linguistic properties and offering no general account of crosslinguistic variation. At 
present such universals are missing, apart from the automaton. 
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A different way to tackle this regular variation, aka  Greenberg universals, is  to look at it 
as a coordination game problem in Schelling=s spirit.  Language  learning requires the  
input from the community where the learner grows up. All learners must converge on the 
input grammar, that is, they must coordinate their grammars with those of the input. 
When coordination problems persist  among members of a community, that community 
yields regular patterns to  solving such problems, otherwise they adopt them from other 
communities (for example, by cultural difusion ). These regular patterns come to be 
common knowledge in the community 39 . Note also that in a coordination game an 
agent selects an action in an undetermined way within a bounded set. Thus we expect 
different conventions for different communities,  using a  bounded number of actions. 
In fact, some computational models of language evolution  suggest  that overt empirical  
universals arise out of multiagents evolving across generations 40.Linguistic 
generalizations ( aka rules of grammar ) spring out of cultural transmission, making 
innate Universal Grammar unnecessary.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 D.Lewis, Convention,Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, adopted such a 
view, which can be extended to language learning and evolution.  
40   S. Kirby and J. Hurford, A The Emergence of Linguistic Structure: an 
Iterated Learning Model @, in A. Cangelosi y D. Parisi, Simulating the Evolution of 
Language, London:Springer,2001.  
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